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Abstract
We revisit the May and June 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections and the December 2014 Presidential election
that was held by the June-elected Parliament. The three voting instances provide a political field experiment for
the application of power indices and their interpretation in context. We model the Greek Parliament as a weighted
majority game and assess voting power with the Shapley-Shubik, Holler and when relevant, Coleman’s indices. Also,
based on the actual events, we establish connections between parties and evaluate the Myerson index. We focus on the
influence of institutional rules on the distribution of power among the elected political parties and add an alternative
input to the ongoing political debate about the reform of both the Parliamentary and Presidential electoral system in
Greece. Additionally, our findings contribute to the understanding of the coalition formation process in the particular
context and provide empirical evidence on the performance of non-selective indices in parliamentary multi-party
settings which can be used for comparison by similar case-studies in the future.
Keywords: Decision Making, Weighted Voting Games, Power Indices, Greece, 2012 Elections
JEL Classification: D7:D72, C7:C71.
1 Introduction
The political events that took place in Greece between 2012 and 2015, see Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013],
Teperoglou and Tsatsanis [2014], attracted widespread international attention. Having signed two loan agreements –
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) – that carried harsh austerity measures to avoid bailout, Greece was facing
severe economic problems. The public was divided between supporters and opponents of the MoUs in a new cleavage
that transcended the traditional left-right division. In this environment of political instability, uncertainty about the
future and extended social protests, Greece went to early elections in May 2012. In the elections, 7 parties gained
parliamentary representation. These were – from left to right – KKE, SYRIZA, DIMAR, PASOK, ND, ANEL and
GD, Dinas and Rori [2013]. With agendas of various intensity, KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL and GD were against the
implementation of the MoUs, whereas ND and PASOK were in favor. DIMAR held a neutral, moderate stance,
placing itself as a stabilizing political actor. ND won the elections by a short margin to SYRIZA. However, due to
fragmentation of the electorate’s preferences among the various parties within the pro/anti MoU camps, the elections
could not produce a majority government. After the elections, ND quickly aligned with PASOK, but negotiations with
DIMAR to form a government led to a deadlock and new elections were called for June 2012.
Under more polarized conditions, ND raised its vote share by 10% and again won the elections by a short but
clear margin from SYRIZA. This time and under both domestic and international pressure for a stable outcome, the
negotiations were conclusive and led to an agreement between ND, PASOK and DIMAR. However, the coalitional
government proved fragile and short-lived. Soon thereafter, and under constant friction between its members, DIMAR
abandoned the coalition, posing ND and PASOK with a formidable challenge: to stay in power, the two remaining
governing partners had to ensure a 60% enhanced majority in the Parliament to elect the President of the Republic,
Koliastasis [2015]. The opposition managed to block the election of President, and in December 2014, the Parliament
was dissolved. Elections were called for January 2015 leading to the formation of the currently (as of 2018) incumbent
governing coalition between SYRIZA and ANEL, Tsirbas [2016].
In this paper, we employ quantitative tools for the measurement of voting power, see Felsenthal and Machover
[1998], Napel [2019], to re-analyze the political events of the 2012-14 period from a mathematical point of view.
The motivation for our study is twofold. From a political perspective, these events are still relevant at both domestic
and international level. Along the lasting impact on European politics, the instability caused by these 3 elections has
triggered a still ongoing, political debate about the amendment of both the Parliamentary and the Presidential electoral
rules in Greece, Kathimerini [2016], Naftemporiki [2018], Fotiadou [2018]. From a methodological perspective,
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these elections constitute a rare field-experiment for the application and comparison of power indices. The two
Parliamentary elections were held in a very short period (within 6 weeks) under very similar circumstances. In
both elections, the same 7 parties entered the Parliament and engaged in extensive negotiations to form governing
coalitions. While multi-party settings already pose a difficult test for power indices, see Holler [2018], the Greek
Parliament of 2012 presents an additional challenge: dictated by the pro vs anti MoU cleavage, that transcended
the traditional left-right axis, the connections between these 7 parties were unusually dense and rather unexpected.
Finally, as a dichotomous – yes/no – voting procedure, the Presidential election provides an additional opportunity
for the evaluation and study of power indices with the same parties but at the enhanced 60% quota.
1.1 Methodology
By lack of consensus on the right index, see Holler and Nurmi [2013, 2014], Holler and Owen [2001], we calculate
the most common indices and interpret them with different criteria, see Lane and Mæland [1995], Leech [2002] and
Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] among others. We represent three different instances – May and June 2012 and Decem-
ber 2014 – of the Greek Parliament as weighted majority games and evaluate the Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf,
Deegan-Packel and Public Good (Holler) indices for the 50% majority and additionally the Coleman’s indices to initi-
ate and to prevent action for the 60% majority, see also Leech [2002], Alonso-Meijide et al. [2008, 2013], Zuckerman
et al. [2012]. Based on the parties’ political agendas and public statements about potential coalitions, we establish
a communication structure or set of connections between them and evaluate the Myerson index, Myerson [1977].
Calculations have been performed with the freely available AL.EX4 and ipdirect software programs.
Due to the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices in weighted majority games, Tomiyama
[1987], Freixas [2010], the selection of a specific index does not affect the power-hierarchy among parties. Our
calculations confirmed this property which allowed us to drop the Banzhaf index (absolute and normalized) and focus
only on the Shapley-Shubik index. We further exploited this feature and focus on their induced rankings instead of
their specific values when measuring “party-influence” rather than “payoffs”, see Felsenthal and Machover [1998],
Freixas et al. [2012]. Similarly, our calculations led to equivalent results between the Deegan-Packel and Holler
indices, from which we kept only the latter.
1.2 Summary of results
In the May 2012 elections, the Holler Index (PGI) attributes a disproportionally high power to smaller parties. This
indicates an uneven distribution of power away from the major parties that may have hurdled the process of govern-
ment formation. Remarkably, while SYRIZA is second according to both the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) and the
actual vote share, it is ranked second to last according to the PGI. Compared to the non-selective indices, the Myerson
index utilizes DIMAR’s dense connections and accurately captures its influence in the negotiations by attributing to
it its second highest value of 22% despite DIMAR’s 6.33% parliamentary seat share.
In the June 2012 elections, SYRIZA’s SSI value is equal to 12% despite its 23.67% share of seats. This ranks
SYRIZA equally with PASOK, indicating that both parties wield the same power to influence the negotiations despite
a 14% difference in their vote shares. When it comes to minimal winning coalitions, the PGI ranks SYRIZA second
to last. The low a-priori power of SYRIZA may be attributed to the current electoral rule of reinforced proportionality
and hence, may provide an argument in favor of its revision as Greece transitions from a bipartisan to a multi-
party system, Kathimerini [2016]. Equally interesting are the findings by the informative Myerson index. Being not
monotonic in voting weights, and despite a decrease in PASOK’s share, it now correctly identifies ND and PASOK
as the two main political actors due to their ability to form a government without a third partner. In view of ND’s
and PASOK’s connection and despite a considerable increase in its seat share, SYRIZA’s Myerson value decreases.
Similarly, DIMAR is shown to forfeit the advantage of being a crucial player in the negotiations.
Finally, the evaluation of Coleman’s index of a party to prevent action for the Presidential election of 2014 at the
60% quota reveals an inflated power of the opposition to form blocking coalitions. Given the increasing representation
of extreme, anti-systemic parties in the Parliament and their de facto alignment against any action, this supports the
current debate about the necessity to carefully rethink the Presidential electoral rule as part of a broader Constitutional
revision, Naftemporiki [2018], National Herald [2018].
1.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the mathematical definitions of cooperative
games, weighted voting games and power indices and discuss the Greek historic and political context, before and
during the twin elections of 2012. Sections 3 and 4 contain the evaluation of power indices for the May and June
2012 elections and their interpretation in the specific political context. In Section 5, we study the December 2014,
Presidential election. We summarize our conclusions in Section 6 along with suggestions for future research.
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2 Preliminaries
To make the paper self-contained, Section 2.1 summarizes the notions of weighted voting games and power indices,
using standard notation as in Felsenthal and Machover [1998], Taylor and Zwicker [1999], Leech [2002] and Napel
[2019]. Since our focus is on the interpretation of power indices in the specific context of the Greek elections, a reader
may skip to Section 2.2 without significantly compromising the understanding of the paper.
2.1 Mathematical definitions
We consider a finite set of voters or parties, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Collections S ⊆ N of voters are called coalitions. A
simple voting game G = (N, v) on the set N is defined by a mapping v : S → {0, 1}, which is called the characteristic
function of the game G. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be winning if v (S ) = 1, and losing if v (S ) = 0. The empty
set ∅ is a losing coalition, i.e., v (∅) = 0, and the coalition of all players is winning, i.e., v (N) = 1. Also, we assume
that v is monotonic, i.e., v (S ) ≤ v (T ) whenever S ⊂ T . A simple game v is completely determined by the set of
winning coalitions W = {S ⊆ N : v (S ) = 1} or due to monotonicity, by the set of minimal winning coalitions
M := {S ∈ W : T ⊂ S =⇒ T <W}. Accordingly, for each player i ∈ N, the sets of winning and minimal winning
coalitions that contain player i are denoted byWi := {S ∈ W : i ∈ S } andMi := {S ∈ M : i ∈ S }.
2.1.1 Weighted voting games
Holler and Owen [2001] argue that most parliaments of Western Democracy in fact operate and hence may be studied
as weighted voting systems. A voting body can be thought of as a weighted voting game, G = [q; w1, . . . ,wn], where
G is a simple game, w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈ Rn+ a vector of nonnegative real weights, and q ∈ R+ a nonnegative quota with
the following decision rule: a coalition S ⊆ N is winning, v (S ) = 1, if and only if its total weight, w (S ) := ∑i∈S wi,
meets or exceeds the quota, i.e.,
v (S ) =
1, if w (S ) ≥ q,0, otherwise.
If 12
∑
i∈N wi < q ≤ ∑i∈N wi, then G is also called a weighted majority game. While weighted voting games are simple
games not every simple game can be represented as a weighted voting game, see Hof et al. [2018]. A player i ∈ N is
called pivotal or crucial for a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} if v (S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v (S ) = 0, i.e., if w (S ) < q and wi + w (S ) ≥ q.
For each i ∈ N, let ηi denote the set of all coalitions S for which player i is crucial, i.e., ηi := {S ∈ W : S \ {i} <W}.
Every coalition S ∈ ηi is called a swing for player i. A player i is called a null player if she does not contribute to
any coalition, i.e., if v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S ) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. To exclude the possibility of having two contradictory
decisions, i.e., two simultaneously winning coalitions, we assume that the complement N \ {S } of a winning coalition
S is losing, i.e., that v (N \ {S }) = 0 whenever v (S ) = 1. However, it is possible that for some coalition S , both S and
N \ {S } are losing. In this case, S is called a blocking coalition. This may occur for instance when a supermajority
q > 50% is required for some decision, see also Section 5 for an example.
2.1.2 Classic power indices
A power index ψ assigns a non-negative real number to every voter in a weighted voting game G. To simplify
notation, we will write ψi instead of ψi (G) to denote the value that power index ψ assigns to voter i ∈ N in game G.
The non-negative real number ψi is interpreted as the power of the corresponding player i ∈ N in game G and can be
generally thought of as numerical estimate of the a priori influence or capacity of being decisive of each player/party
in a weighted voting game, Bertini and Stach [2016]. The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI), Shapley and Shubik [1954],
assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
φi :=
∑
S⊆N
s! · (n − s − 1)!
n!
· [v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S )]
where s denotes the cardinality of set S , i.e. s := |S |. It is interpreted as a measure of power as prize or payoff
(P-power), Felsenthal and Machover [1998], and is meant to be a voter’s (party’s) expected payoff – as a percentage –
from entering a winning coalition, Dubey and Shapley [1979], Felsenthal and Machover [1998].The Holler or Public
Good Index (PGI), Holler [1982], Holler and Packel [1983], assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
δi :=
|Mi|∑
j∈N
∣∣∣M j∣∣∣
which is equal to the total number of minimal winning coalitions containing player i, divided by the sum of all minimal
coalitions for all players j ∈ N. The properties of the PGI index are discussed inLorenzo-Freire et al. [2007].
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Coleman [1971] proposes two indices to measure the power of each player. The power of a member i to initiate
action CIi measures the member’s potential to swing a coalition from losing to winning and is defined as the number
of i’s swings relative to the total number of losing coalitions, CIi = ηi/ (2n − |W|). The power of a member i to prevent
action CPi measures the member’s ability to block a decision by means of a swing and is defined as the proportion of
winning coalitions that are also swings for player i, CPi = ηi/|W|. The distinction of power to initiate and power to
prevent an action only matters for bodies which employ a supermajority q, strictly greater than 50%, Leech [2002].
Since Coleman’s indices are equal and equivalent to Banzhaf index at the 50% quota, we use them only in the context
of the Presidential election at the q = 60% quota, see Section 5.
2.1.3 Connections between parties & Myerson index
The SSI and PGI index are non-selective, i.e., deem all possible coalitions as possible and hence provide an a-
priori measurement of voting power. At interim situations, one may exploit existing information about established
connections between parties to evaluate the Myerson index, Myerson [1977]. Formally, given a simple game G =
(N, v), a communication structure on G is defined as a set E of connections or links between parties m, n ∈ N.
Let F := {S ⊆ N : the members of S are connected according to communication structure E} denote the set of all
feasible coalitions given the communication structure E. For any S ⊆ N let C (S ) denote the set of all maximal
feasible subsets T ⊆ S . Then, the E-restricted game GE = (N, vE) is defined by vE := ∑T∈C(S ) v (T ). Then, the value
µi of the Myerson index for party i ∈ N in G is equal to the Shapley-Shubik index computed on game defined by
the characteristic function vE , i.e., µi := φi (GE). If all parties are connected, then the Myerson Index reduces to the
Shapley-Shubik index. This formulation captures the idea that even if two parties are not connected – do not share a
link between themselves – they may still effectively cooperate if they both have a connection with the same mutual
third party, Myerson [1977], Ferna´ndez et al. [2002].
2.2 Political context
We start with a brief description of the historical and socio-economic background in which the elections took place,
based on Dinas and Rori [2013], Teperoglou and Tsatsanis [2014] and Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013]. More
details can be found in Nezi [2012], Koliastasis [2015], Matakos and Xefteris [2016] and Tsirbas [2016].
2.2.1 Historical background
Since the restoration of democracy in 1974 and up to 2009, the Greek party system has been a typical example of two-
partyism with the combined percentage of the two dominant parties, the center-left PASOK and center-right ND, often
exceeding 85% of the total vote. A disproportional electoral system which assigns a bonus of seats to the first party
has enhanced stability in this bipartisan political environment and has aided the formation of single-parity majority
governments. As such, Greek politics lack a history and culture of consensus and communication, Vasilopoulou and
Halikiopoulou [2013], Dimitrakopoulos [2015] and coalitions have been rare and short-lived, Nezi [2012].
2.2.2 Parliamentary & Presidential electoral rules
Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected for 4-year terms in the 300-seat legislature (Vouli ton Ellinon). The Par-
liamentary electoral system in effect during both the 6 May and 12 June elections was a form of semi or reinforced
proportional representation with a majority bonus: the party with the plurality of votes cast was awarded an extra 50
seats out of a total of 300 parliamentary seats. The remaining 250 seats were divided proportionally according to each
party’s total valid vote percentage. Small parties had to reach a threshold of 3% to be represented in Parliament. The
premium of 50 parliamentary seats was received primarily at the expense of the second-place party and the parties not
entering the parliament Patrikios and Karyotis [2008].
The President of the Republic is elected by the Parliament for 5-year terms. This is usually done via a binary
(yes/no) voting process, in which the governing party or coalition proposes a candidate who according to the Greek
Constitution (Article 32) needs to reach 60% of the votes, or equivalently 180 out of 300 MP votes, to be elected1. If
such a majority is not achieved, the Parliament is dissolved and early elections are called, Koliastasis [2015]. Then,
the new Parliament can elect the President with a simple majority of 151 out of 300 MPs. Based on the above and
despite the ceremonial nature of this post, the Greek Constitution effectively gives a veto to a coalition of opposition
parties if they can muster at least 121 (from a total of 300) votes, Tsirbas [2016].
1The actual process is a slightly more complex. Here we restrict attention to the high level description that is necessary for our purpose.
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2.2.3 Party connections and their political positions in 2012
The twin 2012 elections signaled a radical change in the Greek political scene. The electoral results pointed to a
transition from the stable two-party system to a uniform distribution of power among several parties. The traditional
left-right cleavage that had served as a safe predictor of the Greek public’s voting preferences gave its place to a new
demarcation line between Euro advocates and skeptics and between friends and foes of the MoUs, Dimitrakopoulos
[2015]. The main positions of the 7 elected parties are briefly summarized in the last two columns of Table 1. The
parties are presented according to their position in the left-right ideological axis (KKE left to GD far right).
The pro-MoU camp was represented by the traditional parties of ND and PASOK. DIMAR adopted a more moder-
ate stance concerning the necessity of the MoUs, but proclaimed that Greece’s prospect in the EU was non-negotiable.
The anti-MoU camp was more popular, however, its power was fragmented and distributed among many parties –
many of which did not enter the parliament – with different ideology and agenda. Its main delegate was SYRIZA in
the left followed by ANEL in the right. Their “conditionally pro Euro-zone” entries capture their rhetoric that they
had a pro-Euro disposition but that they would consider exiting the Euro-zone in case Greece’s European partners and
lenders were not willing to reconsider the debt agreements.
Connectivity Graph Main Positions
KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD Memorandum Euro-zone
KKE • • anti anti
SYRIZA • • • • anti conditionally pro
DIMAR • • • • moderate pro
PASOK • • • pro pro
ND • • • pro pro
ANEL • • anti conditionally pro
GD • anti anti
Table 1: Connectivity graph and main positions (Memorandum and Euro-zone columns) of the parties in the May 06
& June 12, 2012 negotiations.
The Connectivity Graph in the first part of Table 1 describes connections between parties based on their public
statements about potential coalitions prior and between the twin elections. Due to the pro versus anti MoU cleavage,
the connections are unusually dense and transcend the traditional left-right axis. In the pro-MoU camp, former
foes, ND and PASOK, now stressed the necessity to align forces and form a broad and stable pro-MoU government.
DIMAR assumed the role of a stabilizing political factor with moderate stance willing to participate in any pro-EU
governing coalition. In the anti-MoU camp and despite their ideological differences, the radical-left SYRIZA and
populist-right ANEL advocated the prospect of cooperation on the basis of an anti-MoU government. SYRIZA was
also open to discussions with DIMAR and the ideologically adjacent KKE. However, KKE officially rejected any
prospect of cooperation with SYRIZA. Given KKE’s hard stance, SYRIZA directly addressed KKE’s voters and
indeed poles indicated that almost 50% of KKE’s voters in May, switched to SYRIZA in June. Hence, the indicated
connection between KKE and SYRIZA should be understood at voters’ level. On the right extreme, GD excluded
their participation in any potential government.
3 The May 06, 2012 Parliamentary election
The results of the May 06, 2012 elections are presented in Table 3 and Figure 12. The 50 seats bonus has been already
assigned to ND, i.e., ND’s seats are equal to 58 + 50 = 108. Designed to assist the formation of majority governments
in a two-party system, the electoral rule could not handle the result. As a consequence, a considerable 20% of the total
vote went to parties that did not manage to exceed the 3% threshold and gain parliamentary representation. Coalition
formation to produce a government was necessary. ND and PASOK quickly agreed to become partners and in view of
SYRIZA’s and ANEL’s hard stance, DIMAR was the main candidate to complete the government. However, amidst
increasing polarization, DIMAR refused to cooperate, the discussions led to a stalemate and new elections were called
for June 12, 2012.
3.1 Measuring a priori power: the classic indices
The Greek Parliament after the May 06, 2012 elections can be described as the weighted voting game G = [151; 108,
52, 41, 33, 26, 21, 19]. The 151 seats correspond to simple majority, q = 50%. Table 3 shows the values of the
2Source: Papanikos [2012] and Greek Ministry of Interior. To create Figure 1, we used: WmfLabs.
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May 06, 2012
Political Party % Votes # Seats % Seats
ND 18.85% 108 36.00%
SYRIZA 16.78% 52 17.33%
PASOK 13.18% 41 13.67%
ANEL 10.60% 33 11.00%
KKE 8.48% 26 8.67%
GD 6.97% 21 7.00%
DIMAR 6.11% 19 6.33%
Table 2: Votes share, Seats and Seat share. Figure 1: Parliament (left to right), May 06, 2012.
Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) and Holler or Public Good Index (PGI) which are also depicted graphically – along with
the parliamentary seat share of the parties – in Figure 2. Our main findings are the following. First, the SSI largely
Political parties: May 06, 2012
Power index KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD
Shapley-Shubik 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.46 0.09 0.06
Holler 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.13
Table 3: Majority at 50+% (151 MPs): a priori voting power in May 06, 2012.
coincides with the parliamentary seat share of all parties except for the winning party, ND. Interpreted as a measure
of P-power, Felsenthal and Machover [1998], the SSI shows that ND anticipates an inflated share on the potential
spoils from forming a government. ND’s SSI is equal to 46% compared to its seat share of 36%. Second, the PGI –
which considers only minimum winning coalitions – attributes a disproportionally high power to the smaller parties.
This captures the uneven representation of the vote and distribution of power away from the major parties which can
hurdle the process of government formation. Accordingly, if taken into account, it may give an incentive for strategic
voting to voters who prioritize stability (parties that are likely to win the elections) over their true party preference.
When focusing on the induced rankings of the political parties instead of their specific values, see also Freixas et al.
[2012], we observe that even though PASOK, ANEL and KKE have different seat shares, they have the same rank
and hence the same power to influence the negotiations (I-power). The same applies for GD and DIMAR. Finally, it
is remarkable that while SYRIZA is second according to both the SSI and the actual vote share, it is ranked second
to last according to the PGI. This may reflect the intuition captured by Holler and Nurmi [2014] that “it could well be
that a larger player is not always welcome to form a winning coalition if a smaller one does the same job”.
Figure 2: Parliamentary seats share and main P-Power indices after May 06, 2012 elections.
3.1.1 Connections between parties and Myerson index
Based on the connectivity graph (Table 1), we calculate the Myerson index, which is given in Table 4. The two leading
parties, ND and SYRIZA, have an index close to their actual seat share. GD is not connected to any other party and
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KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD
Myerson index 0.05 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.32 0.05 0
Table 4: Myerson index for 50% majority after May 06, 2012 elections.
hence, it has the role of a null player in the negotiations. On the other extreme, KKE is only connected – as mentioned
above only implicitly – with the neighboring SYRIZA and hence, its power is less than its actual vote share. Yet, the
most striking feature of the Myerson index is that it accurately captures DIMAR’s influence in the negotiations and
its crucial part in the formation of a coalitional government. Owing to its dense connections by its moderate stance,
DIMAR has a Myerson-index of 22% compared to its 6.33% parliamentary seat share. Similar –yet less inflated
due to less connections – are the figures for PASOK. These observations can be compared with the a-priori rankings
induced by the non-selective Shapley-Shubik and Holler indices.
4 The June 12, 2012 Parliamentary election
After the May deadlock, Greece headed for a second election, scheduled on June 12, 2012. The campaign took
place under the same severe social and economic problems, extreme uncertainty and volatility as well as increasing
external and domestic pressure to produce an outcome that would enable government formation, Vasilopoulou and
Halikiopoulou [2013], Dinas and Rori [2013] and Dimitrakopoulos [2015]. The results of the June 12, 2012 elections
are presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. Again, the 50 seats bonus has been awarded to ND and is incorporated in
the figure below. This time the negotiations were successful and led to the formation of a coalition government
June 12, 2012
Political Party % Votes # Seats % Seats
ND 29.00% 129 43.00%
SYRIZA 26.89% 71 23.67%
PASOK 12.28% 33 11.00%
ANEL 7.51% 20 6.67%
GD 6.92% 18 6.00%
DIMAR 6.25% 17 5.67%
KKE 4.5% 12 4.00%
Table 5: Votes share, Seats and Seat share. Figure 3: Parliament, June 12, 2012.
between ND (129 seats), PASOK (33 seats) and DIMAR (17 seats) that was enjoying a (seemingly) solid majority
of 179 seats. It is worth mentioning that DIMAR was not crucial anymore in this coalition. The configuration of the
cabinet in August 2012, which did not correspond to the distribution of seats, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013],
was composed of 13 ministers from ND, two nominated by PASOK and two nominated by DIMAR. In reality, the
governing coalition proved problematic and after short time conflicts began, Koliastasis [2015]. DIMAR withdrew
from the government in June 2013. This left ND and PASOK with a slim majority of 162 seats, clearly short from the
required 180 votes to win the upcoming Presidential election of December 2014 and remain in power.
4.1 Measuring a priori power: the classic indices
The Greek Parliament after the June 12, 2012 elections can be described as the weighted voting game G = [151; 129,
71, 33, 20, 18, 17, 12]. The Shapley-Shubik and Holler a priori power indices are given in Table 6. As in Section 3.1,
they are also depicted graphically, along with the parties’ parliamentary seat shares in Figure 4. Compared to the
Political parties: June 12, 2012
Power index KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD
Shapley-Shubik 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.52 0.06 0.06
Holler 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.14
Table 6: Majority at 50+% (151 MPs): a priori voting power in June 12, 2012.
May elections, our main findings are the following. The SSI now significantly deviates from the actual parliamentary
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seat share for both leading parties, ND and SYRIZA. Also, the SSI value of the governing partners ND, PASOK
and DIMAR reflects the aforementioned difference between the assignment of ministers and their actual distribution
of seats. This may provide a hint about the problematic nature of the governing coalition and the frictions between
its members that surfaced soon after its formation. SYRIZA, the main opposition party, has an SSI value of 12%
despite a 23.67% percentage of seats. This ranks SYRIZA equally with PASOK, and hence both parties have the
same power to influence the negotiations, despite a 14% difference in their vote shares. When it comes to minimal
winning coalitions, the Holler index shows a remarkably uniform distribution of power with only a slight advantage
for the leading ND. It is worth noting, that the governing coalition that eventually formed between ND, PASOK and
DIMAR was not minimal. As in the May elections, SYRIZA is ranked second to last by the PGI. The low a-priori
power of SYRIZA may be attributed to the electoral rule and the 50 seat bonus that is given to the first party.
Figure 4: Parliamentary seats share and main P-Power indices after June 12, 2012 elections.
4.2 Connections between parties and Myerson index
Using the connectivity graph in Table 1, the Myerson index for the June 12, 2012 elections is given in Table 7. Again,
KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD
Myerson Index 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.42 0.03 0
Table 7: Myerson index for 50% majority after June 12, 2012 elections.
the Myerson index provides some of the most interesting insights. ND, with a value close to its actual seat share and
PASOK are identified as the two main political actors. Remarkably, SYRIZA’s value has decreased from 0.18 in May
to 0.12 in June, despite SYRIZA’s gain of 20 seats, whereas PASOK’s index has surged to 0.28 from 0.18 in May,
despite a loss of 8 seats. While it is well known that the Myerson index is not monotonic in voting weights, this
instance reflects the improvement in PASOK’s strategic position due to its connection to the leading ND and the fact
that their combined seat share now exceeds the required 50% majority to form a government, cf. Table 5. In turn,
this implies that SYRIZA, despite its increased seat share, has less power to influence the negotiations. Similarly,
DIMAR’s reduced value captures that DIMAR has forfeited its strategic advantage since it is no more crucial for the
formation of a governing coaltion despite having retained its voting share and connections. Finally, the value of the
three less connected parties, KKE, ANEL and GD has remained low in agreement with their marginal impact in the
negotiations.
5 The December 29, 2014 Presidential election
To more accurately assess the distribution of power between the elected parties under different institutional rules, we
evaluate power indices at the 60% majority which is relevant for the 2014 Presidential Election that was held by the
same Parliament. We use the parties’ seat shares after the June 12, 2012 elections and ignore subsequent strategic
placements by parties or the independence movements by MPs.
As mentioned above, by December 2014, DIMAR had left the government and the remaining parties, ND and
PASOK, had to ensure a parliamentary majority of 180 out of 300 MPs to elect the new President of the Republic
and remain in power. This provided a doubtless test to the ruling coalition’s stability and as Dimitrakopoulos [2015]
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correctly predicted, it enabled the opposition to lead the country to early elections in 2015. Eventually, the ND-
PASOK candidate reached a total of 168 approval votes, 12 short of the required majority. The remaining 132 MPs
concentrated in the disapproval camp which comprised the whole parliamentary teams of SYRIZA and ANEL, a part
of the dissipating DIMAR and de facto the left and right extreme, anti-systemic parties, KKE and GD. Politically,
SYRIZA’s stance to align with the no-camp and block the Presidential election was rewarded by the electorate with a
clear winning margin in the early elections of January 2015 that followed.
5.1 Measuring a priori power at 60%
Using the seat shares from the June 2012 elections, the Greek Presidential election of December 29, 2014 can be
described as the weighted voting game G = [180; 129, 71, 33, 20, 18, 17, 12]. The a priori SSI and PGI are evaluated
at the 60% majority in the first part of Table 8. The main finding of the SSI is that SYRIZA, the main opposition
Political parties: December 29, 2014
Power index KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL GD
Shapley-Shubik 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.63 0.05 0.03
Holler 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.31 0.12 0.12
Coleman’s to prevent 0.02 0.36 0.06 0.23 1 0.11 0.11
Coleman’s to initiate 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.14 0.58 0.06 0.06
Table 8: Enhanced majority at 60% (180 MPs): a priori voting power in December 29, 2014.
party, is now ranked second by a clear margin from the third party (in number of seats) PASOK. At the 50% majority,
SYRIZA and PASOK were tied at the second place, cf. Table 6. Moreover, at the 60% quota, the smaller parties are
ranked according to their seat share, cf. Table 5. The PGI attributes disproportionally high power to smaller parties
and ranks SYRIZA in the last position together with KKE.
However, the main purpose of assessing the distribution of power at the 60% quota, is to measure the governing
coalition’s power to pass an action and the power of the opposition to block this action. Thus, we focus on Coleman’s
indices of a party to prevent (CP) and of a party to initiate (CI) an action respectively, see Leech [2002]. The results for
the CP and CI indices are given in the second part of Table 8. The CP index is the first to capture SYRIZA’s uneven
power to influence the outcome at the 60% quota. Even more striking, is the power that the CP index attributes
to the right extremist party, GD, to prevent action. Ideologically isolated from the other parties and a null player
when it comes to forming winning coalitions, GD becomes an influential actor at preventing actions. Given the de
facto alignment of anti-systemic parties at the “no”-camp, this reveals an uneven advantage for the opposition to
influence the outcome and block actions at the 60% majority. A similar finding also holds for the ANEL who wield a
disproportionally high power and have become a crucial political factor. Finally, the CI index attributes a combined
power to ND and PASOK to initiate an action at the 60% quota that is considerably less than 1, indicating that a more
broad cooperation is required to pass an action at this level.
5.1.1 Strategic considerations
The 2014 Presidential election was the first that took place in the presence of a high share of anti-systemic parties.
Given the predisposition of such parties against any action in the Parliament, the above findings about the uneven
power of the opposition to block actions at the enhanced majority raise concerns about the prevailing institutional
rules. While a “yes”-vote indicates support to the proposed candidate and implicitly a vote of confidence to the gov-
ernment, the interpretation of a “no”-vote is more involved. It may range from disapproval of the specific candidate to
distrust to the government. However, the “no”-vote also accommodates the anti-systemic voices of extremist parties
that express their de facto disapproval of the process. In this way, ideologically opposing parties unavoidable align
in the same camp and produce confusing electoral outcomes that do not represent the electorate’s preferences. In the
particular instance of the Presidential election, KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL and GD found themselves aligned in the same
camp despite having very different and even competing platforms. The combined effect of this unavoidable misalign-
ment is a distortion of the voting procedure and of the resulting outcome. As electoral rules change to accommodate
systemic changes in the electorate’s preferences, Ortona [2002], the above findings provide an additional argument
for the suggested revision of the Presidential electoral rule as part of a broader Constitutional revision, Naftemporiki
[2018], National Herald [2018].
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6 Conclusions & future research
We employed power indices to revisit the twin Greek Parliamentary elections of May and June 2012 and the Pres-
idential election of December 2014. We modeled the Greek Parliament as a weighted majority game and evaluated
the Shapley-Shubik and Public Good (Holler) indices and when applicable the Myerson and Coleman’s indices to
assess the distribution of power among the elected political parties. The evaluation of the indices contributed to our
understanding of the electoral results and, what is usually less considered, of the parties’ electoral strategies. From
a methodological point, our findings provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of non-selective indices such
as Shapley-Shubik and Public Good in the densely connected, multi-party setting of the present case-study. Beyond
their traditional application in committee settings, this performance indicates that power indices may prove useful in
similar studies on the current European Parliaments of increasing diversity and connectivity among political parties.
In the current political context, our findings shed light on the influence of electoral rules in the distribution of
power among elected parties and provide an input to the heated political debate in Greece about the need to reform
both the Parliamentary and Presidential electoral rule, National Herald [2018]. Teperoglou and Tsatsanis [2014] argue
in favor of a simple proportionality system to mitigate the pressure for strategic voting, a thesis also adopted by the
incumbent government, Kathimerini [2016]. Such proposals naturally raise the question whether the new electoral
rules will adequately capture public preferences or not and require closer scrutiny, McParland [2012]. In a different
direction, Koliastasis [2015] and Tsirbas [2016] observe that Greek voters become increasingly favorable towards
coalitional governments and highlight the need to study the concentration or fragmentation of political power in the
evolving party system. All the above attest to a rapidly changing political ecosystem in Greece that forms an attractive
research topic for the mathematical, social and political sciences.
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